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The Impact of Recent Reforms 
on the Institutional Governance 
of French Universities 
 STÉPHANIE CHATELAIN-PONROY , STÉPHANIE MIGNOT- GÉRARD, 
CHRISTINE MUSSELIN AND  SAMUEL  SPONEM 
 It is usual to identify France as a latecomer in New Public Management (NPM). 
As stressed by P. Bezes ( 2003 and  2009 ), while the  souci de soi of the French 
state has always been present and the reform of the management of French 
public administration has been a recurrent objective during the Fifth Republic, 
it is only in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s that the NPM doc-
trine really diffused into the French public system. The important transforma-
tions experienced by the higher education system until then (Musselin  2001 
[2004]) could therefore not be analysed as a consequence of NPM (Musselin 
and Paradeise  2009 ). 
 The introduction of NPM methods and solutions in French administra-
tion, now in place for a decade, fi rst reached universities in mid-2000 when 
the new budgetary process that was introduced into French public administra-
tion (the LOLF,  Loi organique sur les lois de fi nances ) was also implemented in 
public higher education institutions. In order to negotiate their budget, they 
now have to set objectives and indicators that will then be used to measure the 
achievement of these objectives a year later, when they will write a report about 
the past year. Further major changes, which will be described below, were 
introduced after 2005. They not only brought in new instruments and devices 
to the management of French universities (more competitive processes, per-
formance-based allocation of resources, empowerment of university leaders, 
etc.), but more broadly affected some of the principles on which the French 
university system was built and, in particular, the egalitarian principles that 
maintained a rather low differentiation among French academics and among 
French universities and the grades they delivered. 
 The aim of this chapter is, therefore, primarily to describe the governance 
of French universities after the introduction of the recent reforms and answer 
the following questions: did these changes affect the governance of French uni-
versities or did they resist the transformations that aimed at strengthening the 
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1 presidents, increasing project-based research and providing them with more 
autonomy and responsibility? 
 In order to answer these questions, we will draw on research carried out 
in France in 2011. It consists of two studies, one (Musselin  2012 ) based on 
interviews (around 100) in three French universities (ScienceUni, HSSUni 
and MultiUni 1 ), and the other (Chatelain-Ponroy  et al .  2012 ) resulting from 
a survey addressed to all universities: we received 2,600 answers, a response 
rate of around 22 per cent. In both cases, our sample included the presidents, 
vice-presidents, the registrars and their main collaborators, members of the 
councils, deans, heads of department and of research units and their main 
administrative support. The survey mostly consists of Likert scales from 1 to 7 
(average at 4) that can be translated into percentage (the per cent of ‘pro’ is 
obtained by adding all those who chose 5, 6 or 7; the per cent of ‘anti’ by adding 
all those who chose 1, 2 or 3). 
 Because of the empirical emphasis these studies put on academic and 
administrative managers of French universities, our aim is not to say whether 
the reforms deeply and really affected academic activities. Our focus will be on 
changes in governance and on the reactions and behaviours of those in charge 
of implementing the reforms and managing universities. 
 In the fi rst section, we will describe the main characteristics of the French 
higher education system and of universities within this system. We will then 
present the recent reforms and their main objectives. Three main evolutions 
will then be observed. First, it will be shown that the reforms were used by 
presidents but also by managers of the university administration to central-
ise decision-making and information processes. Second, reforms justifi ed 
and favoured the collection and production of data and indicators, as well as 
the recruitment of internal auditors, but until now the use of this informa-
tion remains rather limited. Finally, we will stress the role of the reforms in 
giving priority to research and research performance and how this increased 
the impact of external providers of evaluation on the governance of French 
universities. 
 French Universities: a Recent Institutional Re-birth 
 Each national university system is specifi c, strongly embedded in national 
institutional settings and results from a specifi c history. This is especially 
true for the French system because of the particularly disrupted trajectory of 
French universities (Renaut  1995 ). Their suppression by the French Revolu-
tion 2 in 1793 had been a crucial step because Napoleon in 1806 re-created the 
 discipline-based faculties ( Facultés ) but not the universities. He installed a 
unique Imperial University for all France, steered from Paris, and composed of 
the  lycées and the faculties. This had far-reaching consequences for the French 
university system. 
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1  First, and despite the fact that the 1896 Act administratively re-formed uni-
versities about a century after their suppression, the discipline-based  facultés 
have long been the main pillars of the French system and the natural inter-
locutors of the Ministry. This vertical discipline-based structure of the higher 
education system led to rather differentiated careers and status from one type 
of discipline to another, and to the early specialisation of students within a 
discipline. When universities were fi nally rebuilt in 1968 the aim of the reform-
ers was to destroy the  facultés and create multidisciplinary institutions organ-
ised around UER ( Unités d’enseignement et de recherché ) – large departments 
responsible for teaching and research. They also provided the new universities 
with administrative, budgetary and pedagogical autonomy and a stronger and 
more legitimate type of governance: they should be led by presidents who are 
elected by and from among academics; university bodies consisted of elected 
representatives from the academic staff, the administrative staff, and students 
but also from representatives of stakeholders ( personnalités extérieures ). While 
the Ministry in fact rapidly regained the autonomy granted by the law (Cohen 
 1978 ), the multidisciplinary project also failed in most big cities (Paris of 
course but also in Bordeaux, Grenoble, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Strasbourg, Tou-
louse, etc.) where the former  facultés engaged in negotiations that led to the 
creation of two or three new universities that each only covered a limited span 
of disciplines. In Paris, for instance, the former Sorbonne (that is the  facultés 
of Law, Medicine, Science and Humanities) split into seven new universities 
(from Paris 1 to Paris 7), combining parts of two or three of the fi ve main 
families of disciplines but never all of them. Thus, the new universities created 
from the former  facultés remained often dominated by a prominent discipli-
nary  orientation 3 and only small metropolises have ‘complete’ universities. 
 The reform of governance was more successful (in the sense that it has been 
implemented and maintained) but it took time to work out. During the fi rst 
years, the new bodies had to learn how to work and in many places strong ideo-
logical confl icts arose. The French intellectual René Rémond, who served as the 
fi rst president of the University of Nanterre, clearly described his experience 
(Rémond  1979 ) in a book where he showed how diffi cult and tumultuous the 
fi rst years had been. Moreover, during the fi rst decade, it was diffi cult for the 
new presidents to really exercise their new functions while the deans remained 
the main interlocutors of the Ministry and were behaving and recognised as 
 primus inter pares in their new  facultés (UER). 
 As a result, the new Act of 1984 and the more recent Act of 2007, both of 
which aimed at reforming university governance, were still strongly oriented 
towards the empowerment of the university president  vis-à-vis the ‘new  facul-
tés ’ (now called UFR,  Unités de Formation et de Recherche ) and their deans, in 
order to strengthen the university’s governance. 
 Nevertheless, since 1968, whatever the reforms, some principles have never 
been affected. First, the fact that deans and presidents are elected by their peers 
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1 was never discussed, nor changed. Since 2007, all members of the university 
councils 4 , except the stakeholders, elect the president for a four-year period 
that can be renewed once. The governance of French universities thus results 
from three channels of coordination: the administrative, the ‘political 5 ’ and the 
deliberative one (see  Table 5.1 ). Second, the presence of stakeholders sitting in 
university councils was also always maintained and even reinforced in 2007. 
But it has never been very effective: university councils are very much involved 
in micro-management and their meetings last so long that stakeholders are 
quickly discouraged from attending. Thirdly, and because the president, the 
vice-presidents and the deans are elected, they are not considered as part of the 
administrative staff: they are fi rst of all academics, even if they exercise leader-
ship functions. Therefore, they usually 6 go back to their department after their 
term. Their career is still run by academic bodies and they are, from this point 
of view, clearly distinct from the administrative staff who have a different status 
and different career paths within the French civil service. The latter are called 
the administration or the central administration while the elected academic 
leaders are often called ‘the policy-makers’ ( les politiques ). 
 A second consequence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Impe-
rial University has to do with the weak differentiation between the secondary 
 Table 5.1  Hierarchical and functional relationships in French universities 
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1 and the higher education systems.  Facultés in the nineteenth century fi rst and 
foremost delivered grades but offered few classes. It changed with the reforms 
at the end of the nineteenth century, but many of the  grandes écoles with the 
greatest prestige today were already created, were engaged in a more vocational 
style of training and some were already aimed at training the French elites. The 
steady increase in students attending classes at the university, which happened 
from the beginning of the twentieth century, did not change the main function 
of French universities which was the training professors and future academics 
but also preparing students for intermediary jobs in the public administration. 
This led to a curious, and French-specifi c, situation where universities were 
never the most prestigious higher education institutions. 
 A third consequence of the Napoleonic conception, in strong contrast with 
the Humboldtian one, is that it did not consider research as a core mission of 
universities. The reforms at the end of the nineteenth century aimed to pro-
mote research in universities but they failed. This led to the creation in 1936 
of a new institution entirely dedicated to research, the CNRS ( Centre National 
de la Recherche Scientifi que ), and many others (INRA for agricultural research, 
INSERM for life sciences, etc.) in the next decades. Nevertheless, in the mid-
1960s the teaching-research divide installed by this institutional division of 
work was criticised and more interactions between universities and national 
research institutions were expected. The CNRS selected some high perform-
ing university research units that became associated both with their university 
and with the CNRS, and this provided them with funding and CNRS human 
resources. At the workshop level, almost 50 years later, the CNRS-university 
divide is therefore blurred but, at the institutional level, universities and the 
CNRS have remained separate institutions. It is only recently that they both 
entertain more cooperative relationships and co-determine the scientifi c policy 
of universities; previously the CNRS wanted to impose its views on universities. 
 The trajectory of French universities is thus marked by the recent creation 
of the contemporaneous universities, the more prestigious reputation of the 
 grandes écoles and the institutional divide between teaching and research. 
 A Bouquet of Reforms Since 2006 
 This inherited institutional setting has been challenged by two major acts 
passed within the last seven years. The fi rst one, called the LOPRI ( Loi pour 
la recherche et l’innovation [Law for Research and Innovation]) was passed in 
2006. Three major institutional transformations were introduced and some 
tasks, previously carried out by the Ministry, were delegated to new agencies. 
 First, an agency was created to centralise the budgets dedicated to project-
based research 7 . The ANR ( Agence Nationale de la Recherche ) became responsi-
ble for launching calls for research proposals, for all disciplines, that are either 
thematic or ‘blue sky’. The centralisation of funding and the increase in budgets 
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1 from which this agency benefi ted, made project-based research more central 
than it used to be, while the rather high selectivity of this agency (around 20 per 
cent) increased the prestige, the reputation and the material capacity of those 
who were successful. 
 Second, another agency, AERES ( Agence d’évaluation de la Recherche et de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur ) was created to centralise 8 , formalise and standard-
ise the evaluation of the French higher education system. It did not radically 
change the scope of evaluation in France but led to developing the same evalua-
tion procedure for all kinds of research units (whatever their status), all types of 
teaching programmes, and all kinds of higher education and/or research insti-
tutions. Benchmarking became much easier as these evaluations are published 
on the Agency’s website and are therefore accessible to all: public actors, col-
leagues, media, students and their families. Furthermore, these results became 
more linked to the allocation of budgets than in the past. 
 A third major change has to be mentioned in relation to the LOPRI, even if 
this chapter will not describe it in detail. It built on the idea that the French uni-
versity landscape was too complicated and unreadable, so that a larger univer-
sity entity (called PRES,  Pôle de recherche et d’enseignement supérieur ) should be 
formed by joining together universities, or universities and  grandes écoles located 
in the same region, in order to better coordinate their strategies and training and 
research activities, mutualise some of their tasks and possibly adopt the same 
institutional signature. In some places, these new collaborative synergies led to 
mergers: for example, the forthcoming merger of Musselin and Dif-Pradalier; 
Strasbourg since January 2009; Marseille and the University of Loraine since 
January 2012; and the New University of Bordeaux to be created in January 2014. 
 One year after the LOPRI and a few weeks after the election of Nicolas 
Sarkozy as the head of France in August 2007, another act, the LRU ( Libertés et 
Responsibilités des Universités ), was passed, which aimed to transform the inter-
nal governance of French universities. The main orientation of this act was to 
provide more formal power to university presidents, but the most revolution-
ary consequence was the devolution of the payroll to French universities (this is 
the RCE process,  Responsibilités et Compétences Elargies ). Before this, university 
presidents only managed the operating budget: positions were managed at the 
government level and universities were only in charge of the administrative 
management of their personnel. Now they manage the budget for payroll. As 
the payroll represented a signifi cant proportion of university expenditure their 
overall budget often multiplied by three or four times. 
 As clearly shown by this brief summary of the main targets and contents of the 
2006 and 2007 acts, the formal changes that were introduced were quite impor-
tant. They were all the more so because, over the same period, two major ideolog-
ical changes also occurred. First the, in principle 9 , very egalitarian French system 
was challenged by the smooth but nevertheless real link that was introduced by 
the linking of budgets with the results of evaluation. Inputs (numbers of students 
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1 for instance) are still very important in the formula calculating the budget of each 
university, but outputs are now playing a small role in SYMPA (the name of the 
new formula that was introduced after 2007). Some moves from equality to equity 
and merit happened. Second, the idea of a relatively equilibrial landscape across 
France, as well as the idea that when imbalances exist they should be reduced, 
were abandoned in favour of a much more differentiated orientation that was 
fi rst refl ected in the high selectivity of the ANR and then by the concentration of 
resources on some institutions and major scientifi c clusters that resulted from the 
calls for projects of excellence for the Investing for the Future policy 10 . 
 Reforms as an Opportunity to Centralise Information 
and Decision-making 
 While the LRU focused on the presidents and provided them with more deci-
sion-making power, the two studies make it clear that they were not the only 
benefi ciary of this measure: the LRU, and even more the RCE, have been used 
to fi ght against the decentralisation of French universities and the autonomy of 
the  facultés . In the survey 72 per cent of the respondents disagreed with the idea 
that ‘over the last few years, their university experienced more decentralisation’. 
 A Reinforced Central Administration 
 In order to cope with the new functions, but also with the increase in respon-
sibility in terms of budget and human resources, most universities either 
recruited new staff and did their best to attract new profi les or increased the 
level of competences and qualifi cations of their administrative staff by trans-
forming low-skill positions into less numerous but more qualifi ed positions. 
This led to a quantitative but initially to a qualitative strengthening of the cen-
tral administration. New functions were also created in order to improve the 
systems of information, promote internal auditing, develop managerial prac-
tices and introduce new software. 
 A Clearer but also Stronger Relationship between the Presidential Team 
and the Central Administration 
 The divide between the elected university leaders (president and vice-presi-
dents) and the administration that was a traditional issue in French universities 
before the reforms (Musselin  1987 , Mignot-Gérard  2006 ) was also affected. As 
stressed by Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard ( 2006 ), building on the typology pro-
posed by Stéphane Dion ( 1986 ) about the relationships between the adminis-
trative and technical services and the elected members in municipalities, three 
main cases prevailed. In the fi rst, called the technocratic model, the central 
administration takes the lead in the university over the academic leaders. In 
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1 this case for most of the time: the presence of the president is not much felt; 
the vice-presidents are isolated from one another and responsible for their own 
domain (budget for one, human resources for the other, etc.); having less tech-
nical expertise than their administrative counterparts (the director for fi nance, 
the director for human resources, etc.), they follow the decisions suggested 
by the latter or resist and enter into confl icts. In the second case, called the 
functional politicisation, the presidential team is strong, cohesive and shares 
a political objective that they impose on the administration by bypassing the 
registrar and acting as managers of each specifi c administrative director. The 
fi rst two models were the more common even if the third one, called ‘dual hier-
archy’, (the president manages the vice-presidents, and the registrar manages 
the administration) was sometimes observed. 
 In recent years, it seems that this last model has become more and more 
common. We observed it in the three universities where we carried out inter-
views. This does not seem to be just a question of chance in the choice of these 
universities because one of the questions asked in the quantitative survey indi-
cates that most administrative staff do not have diffi cult relationships with 
their vice-presidents, even if they also recognise that when they disagree on a 
question, the vice-presidents have the fi nal power of decision ( Table 5.2 ). 
 In the three universities under examination the dual hierarchy model pre-
vailed and worked on a similar basis. On the one hand, each of the leaders is 
managing his/her team. The president animates his/her team of vice-presidents 
and develops cohesive relationships with them, while the registrar is doing the 
same with the team of administrative directors. On the other hand, the presi-
dent and the registrar work closely together and thus coordinate the elected 
and the administrative hierarchy. 
 Concretely, I work very closely with the President. We see each other at 
least two times a day, quite early in the morning at 7:45 to take stock of the 
current issues and then in the evening, when I bring him documents for 
signature. We see each other for a short or long time, but at least twice a 
day. Often more. We work quite a lot on the projects exchange information. 
(Registrar, ScienceUni) 
 Table 5.2 Relationships with vice-presidents 
How would you qualify the 
relationships between 
your service and the 
vice-president in charge 
of the same domain?
They are 
cooperative
They are 
confl icting
In case of 
problems, the 
vice-president 
has the last word
Administrative staff 5.33 3.02 4.93
BK-DEP-SHATTOCK-140042-Chp05.indd   74 2/11/2014   7:50:30 PM
The Institutional Governance of French Universities • 75
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1  As a result, each administrative director is working with the vice-president in 
charge of the same domain (for instance, the vice-president for human resources 
with the administrative director for human resources) but not in a hierarchical 
way. The vice-presidents do not bypass the authority of the registrar. 
 My role as a vice-president is to work with the service in their mission for 
the management of human resources, and to facilitate things with the aca-
demic and administrative personnel in order to spread the message of the 
president and of the university council. My role is to be a facilitator at all 
levels: facilitator for all the decisions made and, before they are made, to 
accompany the decision-making process. 
(Vice-president for Human Resources, MultiUni) 
 It seems as if the respective roles of the different actors were clear and easy to 
respect. This is reinforced by the fact that they all often stress that there is a 
clear divide between the roles of the decision-makers (the ‘ politiques ’ as the 
elected university leaders are called) and the administration. The former are 
supposed to defi ne the orientations and the latter to implement them. 
 The vice-president didn’t know anything before he was chosen. It was a wish 
of the president. He wanted his vice-president for fi nance to play a political, 
not a technical role. The vice-president refuses to acquire a certain level of 
technics. For this, there are the director for fi nance, the accounting agency, 
internal auditors, etc. These people have competencies because it is their 
job. It is not his job. He does not have to recalculate after them. The presi-
dent wanted him to be able to give orientations and to make others work. 
(LettresUni) 
 Things are often more complex and many concrete examples show that 
the borderline between the political and the administrative roles is not that 
straightforward. But it is interesting to observe that the divide between strategy 
and execution, which is so often presented as a managerial rule for an effi cient 
public management, is appropriated by the French senior managers. 
 The Dual Hierarchy is perceived as a Central Player in most 
Decision-making Processes 
 The role played by the central level of French universities not only relies on a 
strengthened central administration and the development of a dual, but coop-
erative, hierarchy. It is also perceived as central by those who answered our 
survey. 
 We identifi ed six different domains of decisions (see  Table 5.3 ) and, for each 
of them, we asked which levels played the more important role in the decisions 
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1 made (academics, directors of labs, deans, university bodies, central admin-
istration, the presidential team, the PRES). Only two levels (the presidential 
team and the university bodies) are considered as being signifi cantly infl uential 
over fi ve domains (all but the teaching domain). The presidential team is even 
considered as the most infl uential on these fi ve domains. 
 In the interviews, many respondents also stressed that the introduction of 
the RCE has been an occasion to redefi ne who is responsible for what and, in 
many cases, to relocate decisions and domains in the central administration 
that were previously left to the faculties. For instance, the management of the 
research budgets is now centralised in one central budget unit. 
 The introduction of new fi nancial software accentuated this trend. Our 
interviewees from the university administrations argued that this software 
(SIFAC) was much more complex than the previous one and that training all 
the administrative staff would be fi rst, expensive, and second, ineffi cient, as 
many would not use it very often (because it is only partly relevant to their job) 
and they would therefore forget how to use it. They therefore decided to give 
the possibility of access to SIFAC to a limited number of ‘qualifi ed’ individuals, 
while others would only be able to consult the information posted on SIFAC. 
 The Traditional Divide between the Centre and the Periphery 
remains Strong and Marked 
 The strengthened relationships between the dual hierarchy at the top of the 
university, the centralisation of decisions, the transfer of competences and 
tasks from the faculties to the central administration, all speak in favour of 
more centralised and therefore also more governed universities. As a result, 
the traditional divide observed in French universities (Friedberg and Musselin 
 1989 ; Mignot-Gérard and Musselin  2002 and Mignot-Gérard  2006 ) between 
the centre and the periphery (the  facultés or UFR) has been reinforced by the 
reforms. 
 First, the deans 12 feel that their situation worsened over the last years. As 
argued in the fi rst part of the paper, this situation is not new and has to be 
linked to the very specifi c history of French universities. After the re-creation 
of universities in 1968, the deans were progressively deprived of some of their 
prerogatives. First, they always competed with the directors of labs on the defi -
nition of the research priorities and the latter, especially when they run a lab 
associated with one of the national research institutions (CNRS or INSERM for 
instance), receive enough resources from outside in order not to feel depen-
dent on the dean. Second, in the 1990s the decision was made to create gradu-
ate schools. This deprived the deans of their responsibility for doctoral level 
study. Third, the implementation of the Bologna process sometimes led to 
the creation of trans-faculty masters programmes, thus blurring the respon-
sibilities of individual deans and often producing tensions between the deans. 
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1 Today, the centralisation of decision-making and information processes have 
further accentuated the trend and increased deans’ unease. 
 ( Question: Do you mean the famous centralised budget unit for research? ) 
Yes, indeed. It means I do not have the signature for these expenses. At the 
level of the  faculté , I am only responsible for the training programmes and 
the day-to-day management. Now, the directors of labs are signing. I can-
not be responsible for this money anymore. All research contracts are man-
aged by the university. (…) We still have a local scientifi c council but if we 
want to develop our research, it is the role of the university. Of course the 
 faculté is associated, but we are no more… While before, I was in charge… 
With the agreement of the president of course.
 (Dean, ScienceUni) 
 Therefore they are more and more confi ned to the management of the bach-
elor level and the day-to-day micro-management tasks (grating doors, water 
leaks…, etc.). They feel they cannot exercise strategic infl uence and that their 
mission is increasingly similar to the mission of their administrative head. 
 This should be a more political function as we are elected. But for the 
moment, I do not see which political ambition I could have, except renew-
ing this building… or very concrete services to my colleagues. But, if we 
speak of university policy, of training programmes, or research policy, the 
dean is no longer a central actor (…). I feel like a link in the university 
chain. 
(Dean, HSSUni) 
 More broadly than the deans, there is a feeling of disconnection between the 
top of the university, its strategy and its decisions and the rest of the university. 
As if the head was thinking by itself while the rest of the body would just follow. 
By contrast with those working in the central administration, most of those 
working in the periphery do not agree that the top of the university listens to 
them, and they think there is some decoupling between the discourse of the top 
and its actions. They are also more often convinced than those in the central 
administration that the top makes decisions without informing staff and that it 
is cut off from the rest of the university (see  Figure 5.1 ). 
 As in many other countries where the institutional autonomy and the stra-
tegic span of universities has been increased, French higher education institu-
tions experienced an increase in the centralisation of the power of decision and 
of the information processes (Braun and Merrien  1999 ; Kehm and Lanzendorf 
 2006 ; Deem  et al .  2007 ; de Boer  et al .  2007 ). But, unlike the other countries, 
this was not accompanied by more responsibilities and decision-making pow-
ers being delegated to the intermediary levels (the deans in France). On the 
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1 contrary, the already existing gap and the rather suspicious relationships that 
prevailed in French universities were maintained, if not strengthened, by 
the recent reforms, thus increasing the distance between the administrative 
and academic managers of these universities and those they are supposed to 
manage. 
 The Development of Internal Auditors and their Impact 
 Another important trend concerns the development of systems of auditing and 
the recruitment of auditors, but also the increased production of data. 
 The Development of Internal Auditing 
 It would be misleading to think that the development of auditing is a com-
pletely recent trend (Solle  2001 ). By the beginning of the 1990s, when four-year 
contracts were introduced between the Ministry and each French university 
and when the fi rst strategic plans had to be written, many universities discov-
ered and became conscious that they had no information about themselves 
and that they needed to produce data. Some auditing services started to fl our-
ish in order to prepare the four-year contracts but some disappeared or were 
put aside by the president after the contractual exercise was over. Nevertheless, 
some auditing services developed over time. By the beginning of the 2000s, 
the introduction of the LOLF, the new budgetary system for the French public 
3.62
3.81
3.87
4.03
2.64
2.90
2.76
5.22
3.54
3.65
3.84
4.14
3.97
4.15
4.28
3.54
3.82
4.01
4.09
3.80
the presidential team is cut from the
rest of the university
the presidential team makes decisions
without informing the rest
of the university
there is a difference between the
discourse of the presidential
team and their actions
the presidential team listens
to the other members
of the university
Would you say that…      (N = 2 003 - 2 035)
Academics Administrative staff in facultés
Central administration Presidential team
Average
 Figure 5.1  Communication and relations between the presidential team 
and the rest of the university 
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1 sector (to which French universities belong), made such services more neces-
sary to meet data needs, particularly as they are now annual and not every four 
years. In a survey they undertook in 2006 Stéphanie Chatelain-Ponroy and 
Samuel Sponem ( 2007 ) concluded that about 65 per cent of French universi-
ties have such a service. In our 2011 survey, the response reached 86 per cent 
and everybody concluded that this trend was expanding (Carassus  et al .  2011 ). 
 Much more information is now available 
 In this more recent survey, we also tried to identify what data was available and 
looked more precisely at data on teaching and research. 
 If we consider teaching, the more easily available data are the rates of success 
of students (75 per cent of universities) and the drop-out rates (70 per cent) 
while data on the average salary for the students’ fi rst job is available for only 53 
per cent of universities and data on the evaluation of teaching by the students 13 
for only 51 per cent. Those working in the central administration are far less 
well informed about this latter data and they also deplore having very little 
information about the number of teaching hours required from academics. On 
the other hand, faculty members are not well informed about the jobs found 
by their students. Therefore, there are not only differences in terms of the data 
that are collected, but also discrepancies in access to the collected data accord-
ing to the functions that are performed. 
 We came to similar conclusions about the data available on research but, as 
a whole, these data are less accessible than those on teaching. Only 54 per cent 
of universities say they have data on scientifi c publications, only 42 per cent on 
research contracts and on their income and expenditure. On each of the fi ve 
items we identifi ed for data on research, it is remarkable that the presidential 
team usually declared themselves to be better informed than the others say 
they are. 
 The use of Information and Data remains Limited 
 Attention paid to data seems rather different according to who is concerned. 
The presidential team (president, vice-presidents, registrar and directors of the 
administration) pay more attention to data on budgets but less to those on 
teaching. Attention paid to research is higher by academics and the presidential 
team. But what is the information used for? 
 In the literature on the use of indicators, some authors like Simons ( 1995 ) 
distinguished between diagnosis and interaction/learning processes while oth-
ers like Cavalluzzo and Ittner ( 2004 ) distinguished between reporting and 
steering or making decisions. Building on this literature, we proposed items in 
our survey aimed at measuring whether data were used for reporting, that is, 
producing data and distributing it in order to provide information to others 
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1 (Ministry, regions, etc.) and thus obtain legitimacy by being accountable or 
whether these data were used in order to encourage interaction and debate 
within the university, whether they are a basis for evaluating and making diag-
noses and, fi nally, whether they are used in order to act, make decisions or 
defi ne strategies. 
 We therefore asked groups of questions aimed at discovering whether the 
data on teaching, research and the budget were used for reporting, evaluation 
or making decisions. We observed that data on teaching are considered fi rst 
as a method of accountability and to dialogue with other partners. They may 
be used also to evaluate the teaching offer of the whole university or negotiate 
with the faculties, but they are rarely seen as a way of steering the university, 
assigning objectives to the different units or discussing training programmes. 
This is also the case for data about budgets. They are used for accountability 
and to interact with the main partners of the university. They are rarely consid-
ered as a way to set objectives. 
 It is quite different if one looks at the use of data about research. They are 
fi rst of all used in order to evaluate research production at the university level, 
but also at the level of the units and of individuals. They allow for comparison 
among units, for allocating budgets and for identifying research priorities. Of 
course they are also used for reporting but their evaluative role is nevertheless 
stronger. 
 With the introduction of new budget processes like the LOLF, but also the 
devolution of more competencies and responsibilities to universities, more 
information is produced and internal auditors have been recruited to meet the 
demands of university managers. But, until now, these data are more often 
used to meet external requirements than to introduce change within universi-
ties. Nevertheless, a more strategic use of these data seems unavoidable, as can 
be expected from the central role attributed to internal auditing by university 
presidents. 
 From Higher Education Institutions to ‘Research Operators’ 
Organisations? 
 The attention paid to data on research is highly compatible with and relevant 
to the fact that research has become a major factor in French universities. This 
might be related to the discourse held by Valérie Pécresse, the Minister for 
Higher Education from 2007 to 2011. She steadily repeated that she wanted 
to ‘bring universities back to the centre of the higher education and research 
system’ and thus to end the divide between national institutions of research 
(CNRS, INSERM, etc.) and universities. This recognition of universities as cen-
tral research providers was encouraged by policy instruments (Hood  1991 ; Le 
Galès and Lascoumes  2004 ) that pushed universities to develop their research 
activity. Two policies were particularly mobilising; the assessment of research 
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1 units by the AERES and the fact that grades were made public on the one side 
and the multiplication of highly selective calls for proposals on the other side. 
 The Importance of Research Performance 
 Research performance has become a major objective for all universities. The 
main reason for this is the level of resource which research generates, while 
the ANR accentuated project-based research and lump sum budgets decreased 
(Barrier  2011 ). Large budgets were also involved in the highly selective calls 
launched through a public bond and the Investment for the Future policy. Uni-
versities therefore pushed their academics to answer calls for research propos-
als; the administration in charge of research distributes information about the 
calls and is expected to help those answering them. But beyond these invita-
tions to apply for grants, university managers have themselves been very active 
in positioning their institutions within the highly selective calls that have been 
launched at the national level. They decide which they will support and provide 
extra services to increase the chance of success. For instance, one of the ‘excel-
lent labs’ put forward by MultiUni benefi tted from the help of a consulting 
fi rm in order to prepare its project. 
 The persons I mentioned before were helped by a consulting fi rm, XXX. 
We funded… The university and the pole for competiveness YYY funded 
the input of this consulting fi rm that very much helped us preparing the 
dossier. We were able to show our strengths, where we wanted to go (…). 
On formal aspects, they helped us a lot. 
(A lab director, MultiUni) 
 In parallel, the level of performance-based budgets has increased. Not only is 
publicity given to the results of the AERES evaluations but the results are used 
in the new formula for budget allocation introduced by the Ministry. There-
fore, winning good grades from the AERES has become a major goal. Some 
universities try to be better prepared for this review by organising mock evalu-
ations before the AERES comes. 
 We did our best to meet the expectations of the evaluation led by the 
AERES. We had a two-step process. My university, MultiUni, imposed a 
mock evaluation led by their own… what they called in English a ‘visiting 
committee’ with a former expert of the AERES. 
(A lab director, MultiUni) 
 Incentives aimed at improving the number of publications and decreasing 
the share of research-passive faculty members were introduced. Some labs 
asked research-passive academics to become only affi liated (to no longer be 
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1 permanent members of their lab). Others push those who do not publish suf-
fi ciently to become co-authors of more research-active colleagues, while in one 
of the three universities specifi c budgets were allocated to research-passive aca-
demics to incentivise them to come back to research and prepare publications. 
 Many also see a marketing issue in AERES evaluations. The grades and the 
evaluation reports are available on the AERES website, as well as the response of 
the evaluated units. Some universities pay a lot of attention to these responses, 
less to contest the reviews than to promote their image by emphasising their 
 plus or to announce new objectives or reforms. 
 Finally, one can read the impact of research through the decisions made to 
reward those who are doing well or to modify the weakest structures. Since the 
introduction of the RCE, universities are in charge of allocating the research 
budget attributed by the Ministry among the research labs. 14 In the three uni-
versities being studied, the results achieved by the labs in the AERES evalua-
tion were taken into account to weight the distribution. The previous budgets 
of research units were multiplied by a coeffi cient that varied according to the 
grades achieved and was different from one university to another. These evalu-
ations are also used when decisions are made about the fi lling of staff vacancies. 
 (Question: What are the best arguments to get a position? Rather teaching 
or rather research?) Both of course. But you are right to say ‘rather’. Every-
body knows that we miss positions for teaching. So it does not help to say it 
again and, since the new act [2007], research is more important. (…) There 
will be no position for a lab that is not well evaluated. It is evident. That is 
what we say to defend the labs that got an A+. 
(Dean, ScienceUni) 
 Research results are also used to justify restructuring, such as closing a lab, 
merging research teams or transferring a research team to another lab. Research 
is therefore a major goal but it is also used to introduce change and justify new 
orientations. 
 External Evaluations are Simultaneously Criticised 
and used as a Management Tool 
 The choice of the scientifi c projects to support and present for the national calls 
for proposals, the identifi cation of the labs to reward with an increased budget 
or the resolutions to merge or suppress research units are, most of the time, 
legitimated by the evaluation or decisions made by the new national agencies 
created by the LOPRI. It is therefore obvious that the increase of interest in 
research has increased the role of funding and evaluation agencies such as the 
ANR and the AERES in different ways. First of all, because the reviews pro-
duced by these agencies are peer-review based, the academics participating in 
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1 the evaluation processes play a very important role and constitute a power-
ful academic elite. Secondly, their role is not only central because they pro-
duce advice that has an impact on university resources, but also because they 
defi ne the norms about what is ‘good’ research, a ‘good’ project, or a ‘good’ 
publication. 
 Although peer-review based, this increasing role for external evaluation 
has provoked many critics because it increases competition among academics, 
increases differentiation between colleagues and between institutions, but also 
weakens the role of unions’ representatives who were previously members of 
the former evaluation bodies 15 . The new norms that are introduced and the 
fact that they are more formalised, rather standardised and organised into tem-
plates are also often criticised by those who denounce the idea of evaluation as 
well as the recourse to a selective allocation of resources. 
 At the institutional level, an important consequence of this evolution is the 
combination of, rather than opposition between, managerial and academic 
control. The external peer-reviews produced by the AERES and the ANR rein-
force the institutional leadership of French universities by providing them 
with evaluations that are used by university managers as a management tool 
to introduce change, to selectively allocate funding, and to legitimate decisions 
(Musselin  2013 ). 
 Conclusion 
 Although France has long been rather impermeable to the implementation 
of NPM devices, the recent reforms (the LOPRI in 2006 and the LRU in 
2007), without putting to the forefront the reference to NPM, silently intro-
duced some of its instruments; a reinforcement of the role of the managers, 
the creation of agencies responsible for competencies previously exercised 
by the Ministry, the increase in competition and the development of selec-
tive funding and performance-based budgets. Two main consequences in 
the governance of French universities were stressed by our interviewees and 
in the survey. First, this created an opportunity for the presidential teams 
and the central administration to push for more centralisation and further 
construct universities into organisations (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersonn 
 2000 ; Musselin  2006 ; Krücken and Meier  2006 ; Whitley  2008 ). Second, more 
emphasis was put on research and research performance, which became a 
major goal as well as a tool for steering. The increasing production of data 
and information could be seen as a third consequence but we observed that, 
until now, these data are not often used to make decisions affecting uni-
versities. University managers rely much more on the peer-review-based 
decisions made by evaluation and funding agencies than on internal data to 
introduce change, modify the allocation of funding or suggest new forms of 
organisation. 
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1  Part of the academic profession, even if critical of this evolution, coped with 
it and ‘played the game’, that is accepted the need to compete for funding, 
answered calls for proposals, tried to get good evaluations from the AERES; 
others were more reluctant and critical. Nevertheless the LOPRI and the LRU 
did not put students and academics on the street, until the end of 2008 when 
the Ministry launched a reform of university training programmes for teachers 
and high school teachers and a reform of academic duties and careers. Between 
the autumn of 2008 to the end of the fi rst semester of 2009 demonstrations and 
protests developed but did not succeed in obtaining major changes. 
 After the election of François Hollande, a national consultation of the mem-
bers and stakeholders of the French higher education system was organised 
( Assises Nationales de l’enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche ) as a catharsis 
exercise (allowing the public and recognised expression of criticism of the past 
reforms), but also as a diagnosis of the problems they raised in order to prepare 
a new act. It was passed in July 2013 and amended rather than withdrew the 
former reforms. The main change 16 introduced probably concerns the formali-
sation of about 30 main higher education  poles in France and thus a further 
push into the development of formal coordination among the higher education 
institutions, including the  grandes ecoles located in the same region, through 
the constitution of ‘university community’ ( communautés d’universités ) that 
can take different forms (from a confederation of institutions to a merger) and 
replace the PRES. 
 If these  communautés d’universités become, as expected by this new law, the 
central actors of the French higher education system, their governance will 
become a major issue. It will also become a major issue for higher education 
analysts. 
 Notes 
 1  We chose one university with a dominant orientation in science (ScienceUni), one with a 
dominant orientation in Humanities and social sciences (HSSUni) and one with all disci-
plines (MultiUni). 
 2  At that time, universities were corporations and the Convention during the French Revolu-
tion suppressed all corporations. 
 3  In a few cases, like in Marseille, some disciplines were present in the three universities that 
were created a! er the suppression of the University of Marseille. Most of the time, the dis-
tribution of academics among the di" erent universities of the same city followed political 
preferences rather than pure intellectual or scienti# c logic. 
  4  With the stakeholders, and the elected representatives of students, administrative sta"  and 
academics, the university councils –  conseil  d’administration in French – could reach up to 30 
members. A scienti# c council and a council for training and student a" airs are also elected 
at the university level and make decisions that are a! erwards con# rmed or rejected by the 
university council. 
 5  It is so called because it is made up of academics who have been elected. 
 6  $ is is less true for the presidents. Many of them engaged in administrative careers a! er their 
term, either at the ministry or as rector of academy. 
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1   7  $ ey were previously in the hands of the CNRS and other national research institutions, but 
also the Ministry for Higher Education, etc. 
 8  Before the evaluation of universities was led by the CNE (National Committee for the Evalu-
ation of universities), research units were evaluated by the scienti# c council of a national 
research institution if they were recognised by one, or by the academic experts designated by 
the Ministry. Training programmes were evaluated by academics designated by the Ministry. 
  9  $ e French higher education system was already more di" erentiated than one would expect 
according to French egalitarian principles: the reputation of French universities varied from 
place to place. 
 10  $ e French government launched a government bond that was largely used to fund research 
and innovation. Di" erent calls were launched to allocate these funds selectively. Some were 
very close to the calls launched in Germany by the  Exzellenzinitiative and aimed at identify-
ing excellent labs (LABEX), excellent scienti# c equipment (EQUIPEX) and excellent institu-
tional projects (IDEX). 
 11  We calculated how many times (X) each level has been cited as signi# cant or highly sig-
ni# cant for an item N and divided X by N. We highlighted in pale blue the levels reaching 
between 40 and 50 per cent, in blue those reaching 50 to 70 per cent and in dark blue those 
over 70 per cent. 
 12  In France, the departments do not always exist and are not a strongly recognised structure, 
therefore the main intermediary interlocutors are the deans, not the head of departments. 
 13  $ is shows that the evaluation of teaching by the students is still not very developed, although 
since 1997 it was supposed to be compulsory when the then minister, François  Bayrou, 
 imposed it. 
 14  Before the RCE, the ministry directly allocated these budgets to the labs. $ e university could 
withdraw up to 15 per cent of the total amount of the allocated resources in order to fund 
their own research policy, which they usually did. $ is withdrawal, o! en called BQR (Bonus 
Quality Research), was used to fund seminars, conferences or seed money for new projects. 
Now universities receive the whole research budget and can allocate it. 
 15  In the new act that should be promulgated in July or August 2013, the AERES was suppressed. 
But it is a kind of symbolic tribute paid to the more critical academics because it will be re-
placed by a  Haut Conseil de l’Evaluation de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche whose 
tasks, responsibilities and operating processes are very close to those of the AERES. 
 16  Another notable change concerns the elections of university presidents: all members (includ-
ing the stakeholders) of the university council, that is now a little bit larger than previously, 
elect the president. 
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